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The ebb and flow of Israel’s relations with the Palesti-
nians are linked organically to its complex relationship 
with Arab countries. Broad trends have applied across 
the region. Under the umbrella of unity, there have 
always been exceptions, rivalries, and tensions within 
the Arab world—and those differences have applied 
to relations with Israel. This paper explores the web of 
relationship between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, and Iraq.
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Abstract
The ebb and flow of Israel’s relations with the Palestinians are linked organically to its complex rela-
tionship with Arab countries. Broad trends have applied across the region. The Arabs collectively rallied 
against Israel in 1948, participated in the conflict when it festered and swelled, were devastated by the 
defeat of 1967, condemned Egypt’s Sadat in 1977 for moving toward peace, and adopted his formula 
only a decade later. But under the umbrella of unity, there have always been exceptions, rivalries, and 
tensions within the Arab world—and those differences have applied to relations with Israel. This paper 
explores the web of relationship between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinians and 
Israeli Arabs, and Iraq.
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As we have seen throughout this exploration 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the very term is 
somewhat misleading— implying as it does the 
notion that a single conflict pits Israel against the 
Arab world, and that the ebb and flow of Israel’s 
relations with the Palestinians are linked organi-
cally to, say, its rivalry with Iraq or its complex 
relationship with Morocco. To a considerable 
extent, this has indeed been true: broad trends 
have applied across the region. After all, the 
Arabs collectively rallied against Israel in 1948, 
participated in the conflict when it festered and 
swelled, were devastated by the defeat of 1967, 
condemned Egypt’s Sadat in 1977 for moving 
toward peace, and adopted his formula only a 
decade later. But under the umbrella of unity, 
there have always been exceptions, rivalries, and 
tensions within the Arab world—and those diffe-
rences have applied to relations with Israel.1
Egypt
For the thirty years between its participation 
in the Arab invasion of the young Jewish state 
in 1948 and the Camp David Accords of 1978, 
Egypt was Israel’s most formidable foe. Its deci-
sion to enter the war in 1948 had not been a mat-
ter of course. It was preceded by a policy debate 
between two principal schools of thought, one 
upholding the raison d’etat of the Egyptian state, 
and the other stressing Egypt’s Arab and Islamic 
commitments, as well as the political impera-
tives of Egyptian leadership and hegemony.2 The 
issue was decided at the eleventh hour by King 
Farouk, who was motivated to join in the war 
against Israel by dynastic considerations and per-
sonal ambition. His decision’s momentous conse-
quences included the monarchy’s own downfall 
four years later, and the humiliation of defeat in 
the war added to Egypt’s already complex atti-
tude toward Israel.3
The 1948 war launched a quarter-century-long 
cycle of violence that included four full-fledged 
wars and a period of low-level conflict known 
as a war of attrition. On the Egyptian side, the 
interplay of ideological commitment, state inte-
rests, and personal ambition was broadened and 
intensified with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
revolutionary regime. As the leader of a messianic 
pan-Arab nationalism, as the head of a military 
regime, as Moscow’s ally, and as the president of 
the Egyptian state who was angry at the wedge 
Israel had driven between Egypt and the eastern 
Arab world, Nasser mobilized hitherto unfami-
liar resources against Israel. Israel viewed Egypt 
as the potential key to a peaceful settlement with 
the Arab world. Yet during most of the Nasse-
rite period the prospect of a settlement seemed 
remote. Israel remained deeply concerned that 
Egypt’s military power alone was a threat, and 
that threat was compounded by Egypt’s ability to 
carry large parts of the Arab
world with it. In a crisis during May 1967 that 
deteriorated into the Six-Day War in June, Egyp-
tian and Israeli misperceptions and misreading of 
intentions and capabilities were extreme.4
Six more years and two more conflicts were requi-
red before Israel and Egypt could begin moving 
to peaceful settlement and reconciliation, but 
the foundations for these were laid in the 1967 
war, during which Israel demonstrated an ove-
rwhelming military advantage, acquired territo-
rial assets for a land-for-peace deal, and dealt a 
devastating blow to Nasser
and his regime. When Nasser died in September 
1970, his heir apparent, Anwar al-Sadat, was seen 
by other contenders for power in Egypt as a har-
mless transitional figure. But Sadat showed him-
self to be an astute politician, able to outwit his 
rivals, and emerged as a true international states-
man—a dramatic personal evolution that set the 
stage for Egypt’s reconciliation with Israel.
As part of his comprehensive reorientation of 
his country’s politics and policies, Sadat decided 
that Egypt must disengage from the conflict with 
Israel. Beginning in 1977, his agenda and that of 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin over-
lapped enough to enable them to conclude the 
Camp David Accords in 1978 and a peace treaty 
in 1979. For Sadat, peace with Israel was neces-
sary to regain the Sinai Peninsula and to build a 
new relationship with the United States. He was 
willing to dispute with the other Arab states over 
his and Egypt’s right to follow this policy, which 
gave priority to Egypt’s own interests over its 
commitment to the Arab and Palestinian causes. 
But at no time did Sadat intend to make a sepa-
rate deal with Israel or to “divorce” his country 
from its Arab context—even though these were 
among the immediate results of the Camp David 
agreements. Begin, in turn, came to agree to a 
complete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai as the 
price for peace with this most important Arab 
state. He also presumed that Egypt would willin-
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gly acquiesce in a perpetuation of Israel’s control 
of the West Bank and that somehow the Palesti-
nian autonomy plan included in the peace treaty 
could be finessed.5 That certainly was not the 
Egyptian view of things.
Implementation of the bilateral components 
of the Israeli-Egyptian agreement proceeded 
smoothly, but the collapse of the autonomy nego-
tiations, the continuation of the Israeli-Palesti-
nian conflict, and Israel’s decision to go to war 
in Lebanon in 1982 combined to produce a very 
negative effect on the fledgling peace between 
Egypt and Israel. This negativity was reinforced 
by Egyptian considerations, including domestic 
Islamic opposition (both to the government and 
to peace with Israel), criticism from Nasserite ele-
ments, and a desire for conciliation with the rest 
of the Arab world. Over the years, Egypt, first 
under Sadat and then under his successor, Hosni 
Mubarak, adopted a policy of cold peace. Under 
this policy, which resulted not from a conscious 
early decision but rather from a murky trial-and 
error process, Egypt honored its principal com-
mitments toward Israel, including diplomatic 
relations, an agreed-on security regime in the 
Sinai, and allowing Israeli tourism in Egypt. But 
Egypt also kept economic and trade relations to 
a minimum, discouraged visits by Egyptians to 
Israel and cultural relations of all kinds, and signa-
led that the regime did not really frown upon cri-
tics of peace with Israel. Nor did the government 
curtail virulent verbal attacks against Israel and 
Jews, but instead invoked its stated commitment 
to freedom of the press.
This mixed policy, which Israel and occasionally 
the United States criticized, on the whole func-
tioned reasonably well, and by the late 1980s 
Egypt’s reconciliation with the Arab world was 
completed. With the Soviet Union’s decline, even 
Sadat’s most bitter critic, Hafiz al-Asad in Syria, 
eventually renewed his country’s diplomatic rela-
tions with Egypt and indicated his readiness to 
try to resolve Syria’s own conflict with Israel.
The inauguration of the Madrid process in 1991 
and, even more so, the formation of the Rabin-
Peres government the following year, should 
have dramatically improved Israeli-Egyptian 
relations. The separate peace with Israel was now 
part of a comprehensive peace process; and the 
new Israeli government used Egyptian help to 
advance its negotiations with the Palestinians, 
eventually signing an agreement with them (the 
Oslo Accords) that was much more attractive, 
from a Palestinian perspective, than the original 
autonomy plan had been.
Yet a real improvement in relations between Israel 
and Egypt failed to happen, either in the 1990s or 
at any subsequent point. Mubarak’s regime could 
not easily dissociate itself from the cold peace 
policy, for it was dealing with a radical Islamic 
opposition, was occasionally pursuing a neo-Nas-
serist regional and foreign policy, and wanted 
to signal that it was not Washington’s captive. 
But the additional, larger dimension of Egypt’s 
coolness was a  renewed sense of Israel as a com-
petitor. This concern was given a new urgency 
by the very success of the peace process. Egypt 
certainly did not wish to see Israel as a regional 
superpower enjoying a special relationship with 
the United States and flexing its military and 
economic muscles throughout the region and 
beyond.
There was a time, before the Oslo Accords were 
signed and for a few months afterward, when 
Egypt appeared reasonably pleased to mediate 
between Israel and other Arab parties. But when 
Israel signed a peace with Jordan, began to norma-
lize its relations with the Gulf States and in North 
Africa, and developed new concepts for regional 
cooperation, this satisfaction was replaced by 
alarm.6 And the principal means Egypt used to 
articulate its unhappiness was through the issue 
of nuclear weapons. Egypt, like the rest of the 
Arab world, had taken It for granted that Israel 
had a nuclear arsenal, even though Israel adhered 
to a policy of studied ambiguity in this matter. 
For years Israeli governments had been using the 
convenient formula that “Israel will not be the 
first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the 
Middle East,” and had consistently refused to 
sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, arguing that it 
was not willing to undertake the treaty’s commit-
ments while countries
like Iraq and Iran might develop nuclear wea-
pons regardless of having signed the treaty. In 
the late 1960s, after considerable tension with 
the United States over this issue, Israel finally 
arrived at a modus Vivendi with Washington; 
also, Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear reactor 
in 1981 displayed its determination to deny the 
option of nuclear weapons to other Middle Eas-
tern countries.
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As the senior Arab state, Egypt traditionally led 
the Arab world’s campaign at the United Nations 
and elsewhere against Israel’s status as a presumed 
nuclear power. Also, as a populous country with 
a large conventional army, Egypt was genuinely 
opposed to the introduction of nuclear weapons 
to the Middle East, and it resented Israel’s quest 
for nuclear deterrence and a nuclear monopoly, 
considering these as symptoms of Israel’s hegemo-
nic and exclusivist ambitions. When the security 
provisions for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai 
were negotiated at Camp David in 1978, Egypt 
raised questions about the nuclear issue and was 
rebuffed. Sadat chose not to insist on the matter 
so as not to obstruct his main goal—regaining the 
Sinai. But for the next fifteen years, Egypt conti-
nued to raise the issue in the customary diplo-
matic settings. When a working group on arms 
control and regional security (ACRES) began to 
meet in 1992 (part of the multilateral track of the 
Madrid process), Egyptian-Israeli disagreements 
over this issue soon emerged, naturally enough. 
But by late 1994, a qualitative change had occur-
red: Egypt began to use the issue to slow the 
diplomacy—first in ACRES, then in the working 
group on environmental issues (given the issue of 
nuclear waste), and finally in the Madrid process 
multilateral steering group.
The change was to some extent due to the UN’s 
approaching April 1995 conference to review the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was scheduled 
to expire that year unless it was renewed. The 
United States wanted the treaty to be renewed 
indefinitely, and to Egypt this seemed like the last 
opportunity to bring pressure on Israel to sign the 
treaty, which it had refused to do. Egypt was able 
to extract from the United States acceptance of 
its demand that a Middle East annex be added 
that did not mention Israel by name but laid a 
foundation for future Egyptian initiatives. Israel 
recognized Egypt’s genuine concern, but it calcu-
lated also that Cairo had a much broader agenda: 
Rabin and Peres could not quite understand why, 
after years of passive opposition to Israel’snuclear 
option, Egypt was shifting to active and vocife-
rous opposition precisely when Arab-Israeli peace 
seemed to be in reach. As they and their advisers 
saw it, this was part of a deliberate effort to slow 
down Israel’s “normalization” in the Middle East.
Puzzled and angry as they were, Rabin and Peres 
chose to moderate their reaction to this Egyp-
tian policy. Israel’s relationship with Egypt was 
too precious and fragile to be guided by emotions. 
They also understood that when conflict between 
the two countries had ended at Camp David, it 
had been replaced not by friendship but by peace-
ful competition.
Incidentally, it also was convenient for both Egypt 
and Israel to pretend that Cairo’s anti- Israel 
moves had been initiated by Foreign Minister 
Amre Moussa, an ambitious man subscribing 
to a new version of pan-Arabism. This allowed 
President Mubarak to stay above the fray as a 
supreme leader, arbitrating among rival factions 
in his government while preserving Egypt’s rela-
tionship with Israel.7
After Peres succeeded the assassinated Rabin in 
1995, Egypt shared some of Jordan’s discomfort 
with Peres’s expansive view of a future Arab-
Israeli peace, but Egypt’s criticism was milder, 
concerned principally with Peres’s quest for a new 
regional order. It was also skeptical of his deter-
mination to have Israel come quickly to a far-
reaching agreement with  Syria, a prospect that 
stirred ambiguous feelings in Egypt. Syria’s defi-
nition of a “dignified settlement” was expressed 
in terms that were in contradistinction to the 
Camp David Accords, and when Israel discussed 
Syria as the key to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli 
settlement, Egypt felt put in second place. But, 
unlike the Jordanians, the Egyptians still hoped 
to see Peres win  in the May 1996 elections, their 
unhappiness with some aspects of the Labor 
government’s peace policies being minor compa-
red with the prospect of a Netanyahu victory.
When Netanyahu won those elections, Muba-
rak’s unhappiness with the new prime minis-
ter and his policies was open and obvious; even 
so, he maintained a dialogue with Netanyahu’s 
government. The Egyptian government also 
allowed further degrees of cultural normalization 
with Israel. Clearly, Mubarak and his aides had 
come to realize that the policy of cold peace was 
playing into the hands of the Israeli right wing. 
At the same time, Egypt took advantage of the 
political change in Israel to cut the peace process 
down to size: Egypt did not want this process 
to transform the regional politics of the Middle 
East. Having Israel come to a settlement with the 
Palestinians and eventually with Syria would be 
one thing; watching Israel use these agreements 
to develop a network of political and economic 
relations across the Middle East, to construct new 
strategic relations with Turkey, and to continue 
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special relations with Washington while remai-
ning a nuclear monopoly—that was another.
The Arab-Israeli armed conflicts of the first 
decade in the twenty-first century—the Israeli-
Palestinian war of attrition (the second intifada) 
of 2000–03, the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006, and 
Operation Cast Lead in 2008—all these confron-
ted Egypt with a dual challenge: the decision to 
maintain its “normal” relationship with Israel, 
even at a cold peace level, plus the conflict’s 
immediate and potential effect on the Egyptian 
street. Like other Arab regimes, Mubarak’s Egypt 
had to take into account the repercussions of the 
media revolution of previous years. In marked 
contrast to earlier crises, the ubiquitous satellite 
television stations brought to numerous Egyptian 
homes graphic, vivid images of these conflicts, 
thereby agitating Egyptian public opinion.
This challenge was particularly apparent during 
Israel’s 2006 war with Hizballah. Like other Arab 
regimes, Mubarak’s government gave Israel’s ope-
ration initial tacit support. It viewed Iran and its 
proxy, Hizballah, as dangerous challengers of their 
own legitimacy and stability and were hoping that 
Israel would deliver a swift, deadly blow to Hiz-
ballah. When that failed to happen and the new 
war lingered for a month, public outrage built 
up, and Egypt and other conservative regimes 
became vociferously critical of Israel’s policies.
During the same decade, conditions also changed 
in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. Egypt was rattled 
by the Hamas takeover of Gaza. Egypt now had 
on its border an entity ruled by the Palestinian 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and allied 
with Iran. Cairo was concerned by large-scale 
influx of Palestinians from the impoverished, 
over-populated Gaza Strip and by penetration of 
agitators and weapons into its own territory. At 
the same time it was pressured by Israel to prevent 
smuggling into Gaza of weapons, missiles and 
rockets in particular— whether above ground or 
in underground tunnels. Egypt did close the bor-
der with Gaza, with very limited exceptions, thus 
becoming in fact a party to the siege of Gaza, but 
its efforts to prevent smuggling into Gaza were 
half-hearted and not entirely effective.
Egypt’s difficulties in this regard derived in large 
part from the Mubarak regime’s declining ability 
to control the Sinai’s Bedouin population. Hamas, 
and to a lesser extent Al-Qaeda, spent large 
amounts of money buying Bedouin cooperation 
in the flourishing Gaza smuggling industry and 
in facilitating occasional terrorist activities in and 
from the Sinai. Another lucrative trade was the 
smuggling of thousands of African migrants and 
refugees through the Sinai and across the long, 
unprotected Israeli-Egyptian border.
The nuclear issue remained another bone of 
contention between Egypt and Israel. Egypt 
could not do much in this regard during the Bush 
years. But Barack Obama made reduction of the 
world’s nuclear arsenal one of his priorities, and 
he was less sensitive to Israel’s concerns than his 
predecessors had been. When a nuclear security 
summit was convened in Washington in 2010, 
Egypt’s diplomats were able to draw on the 1995 
agreement to get Israel mentioned specifically by 
name and obtain a resolution that stipulated fur-
ther discussion of the issue in 2012.
The Mubarak regime’s loss of control over the 
Bedouin in the Sinai was an early harbinger of 
its decline and ultimate fall in the revolution of 
January-February 2011. Israel followed these 
events with manifest concern. Intellectually, 
Israelis realized that in the long range a democra-
tic Egypt and a democratic Arab world would be 
partners for a stable peace. But in more immediate 
terms they were concerned by the fall of a familiar 
regime that was, if not friendly, at least reliable—
and by the prospect that the Muslim Brothe-
rhood and other radical elements might end up 
as partners in any new regime and possibly even 
its masters. For more than thirty years, peace with 
Egypt, cold as it was, had been a cornerstone of 
Israel’s national security. Israel’s view of the revo-
lutionary changes in Egypt were shaped prima-
rily by Jerusalem’s concern with the durability of 
this peace. In the late winter and early spring of 
2011, several statements by Egypt’s new foreign 
minister, Nabil al-Arabi, and other officials, and 
the increased influence of Islamist groups in the 
country, exacerbated Israel’s concern that Egypt, 
while not abrogating the peace treaty with Israel, 
had mounted a path leading to a different regional 
orientation and to a still colder, more limited, rela-
tionship with Israel. These concerns were heigh-
tened by a terrorist attack on August 18, 2011. 
It was launched by a small Palestinian organiza-
tion from Gaza through the Sinai against Israeli 
vehicles traveling to Eilat along the Israeli-Egyp-
tian border. The terrorists wore Egyptian uni-
forms and may have had support from some local 
Egyptian forces. Israeli troops who fought and 
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killed most of the terrorist also killed a number of 
Egyptian soldiers. This led to a large anti-Israeli 
demonstration in Cairo and to fresh demands by 
opposition groups to break the relationship with 
Israel. Egypt’s military leadership stood firm, but 
the frailty of the relationship under the new poli-
tical circumstances was evident.
Syria
Israel’s current relationship with Syria has been 
shaped by a legacy of hostility and rivalry, by 
twenty years of intermittent and unfinished nego-
tiations, and by new realities: the transition from 
Hafiz to Bashar al-Asad, Israel’s departure from 
south Lebanon, the war in Iraq and the ensuing 
deterioration in Syria’s relationship with the Uni-
ted States, and Syria’s alliance with Iran.
For four decades in the aftermath of the 1948 war, 
Syria was Israel’s most bitter enemy among the 
Arab states. Syria’s self-perception as “the Arab 
Nation’s pulsating heart,” its particular closeness 
to Palestine and the Palestinians, and the radi-
calization and militarization of its politics posi-
tioned it as Israel’s fiercest enemy. But the col-
lapse of its Soviet patron and the circumstances 
created by the first Gulf War led Syria to come 
to the Madrid Conference in 1991 and endorse 
the notion of a negotiated peace settlement with 
Israel.
When Yitzhak Rabin jump-started the Madrid 
process in 1992, he (and most of his successors) 
acted on the assumption that they had to sequence 
their progression in the peace process—that the 
Israeli political system would not be able to sus-
tain simultaneous major concessions in both the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights. As a result 
all Israeli prime ministers since 1992 (except for 
Ehud Barak during part of his tenure) have felt 
that they had to choose between a “Syria first” 
and a “Palestine first” policy. In the 1990s the 
Israeli leadership and the Clinton administration 
tended to assign priority to the Syrian track pri-
marily for three reasons. First, the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict is “simpler” than the Israeli Palestinian 
one because it is essentially a territorial conflict 
as distinct from the clash of Israeli and Palesti-
nian nationalisms. Second, unlike the fragmented 
Palestinian political system, Syria was an orderly 
state with a powerful, authoritative government. 
Third, Hafiz Al-Asad (in contradistinction to 
Yasser Arafat) was seen as a reliable, if difficult, 
partner.
And yet, and despite the major investment made 
by President Clinton and his administration, 
Israel and Syria could not reach agreement and 
negotiations collapsed in 2000. Even so, the 
shape of a settlement was adumbrated during 
these years. Israel accepted (hypothetically and 
conditionally) the notion of full withdrawal from 
the Golan, and Syria
agreed to adopt the main components of the 
peace treaty signed by Egypt in 1979: contractual 
peace, diplomatic relations, normalization, and 
security arrangements. What was most glaringly 
lacking was simultaneous political will to make 
the concessions and sign the deal.
The watershed year in the history of this nego-
tiation turned out to be 2000. Hafiz al-Asad 
died and was succeeded by his son Bashar; and 
Israel withdrew fully from Lebanon and severed 
the Gordian knot between its Lebanese problem 
(discussed below) and the Syrian negotiation. In 
early 2001 Ehud Barak was replaced by Ariel 
Sharon, who focused on the Palestinian issue and 
had no interest in a Syrian deal, and Bill Clinton 
was succeeded by George W. Bush, who at the 
outset of his term sought to disengage from the 
Israeli-Arab peace process and shortly thereafter 
found himself on a collision course with Syria’s 
new president.
Hafiz al-Asad had been a master of straddling 
the line. At the height of the cold war, he maneu-
vered between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, taking advantage of Washington’s desire 
to lure him away from Moscow. During the 1990s 
he negotiated a peace agreement with Israel but 
supported a propaganda campaign by Hamas and 
other Palestinian “rejectionists” against Arafat’s 
“capitulation” to Israel. He also supported Hiz-
ballah’s military campaign against Israel in Leba-
non, both because he wanted Israel out of Leba-
non and because he believed that diplomacy had 
to rest on force and power, and therefore pressure 
had to be exerted until an agreement was reached.
His son and successor tried to emulate this 
strategy. The double game Bashar Asad played 
in Iraq before and after the American invasion 
earned him George W. Bush’s hostility. With 
regard to peace talks with Israel, he also pursued 
a two-track line. From an early point in his pre-
sidency, he argued that he wanted to renew the 
peace negotiations with Jerusalem. He changed 
the terms of the peace agreement he had in mind 
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several times, but on the whole he indicated that 
he was willing to adhere to the terms that had 
tentatively been agreed to in the previous decade. 
But he also stated that he was preparing a military 
option should the diplomatic one fail. In addi-
tion to buying advanced weapon systems from 
the Soviet Union and to deploying Scud missiles, 
he struck a secret agreement with North Korea 
to build a nuclear reactor in northeastern Syria. 
Whereas his father had been Iran’s ally since 
1979, Bashar gradually lost the status of Tehran’s 
peer and became the subordinate partner. Under 
Bashar, Syria became the most important com-
ponent in the “resistance axis” constructed by 
Tehran. Hizballah, Hamas, and (the Palestinian) 
Islamic Jihad were the other partners in this 
camp. This camp pitted itself against the United 
States, Israel, and such moderate or conservative 
Arab states as Mubarak’s Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and Jordan. The doctrine of resistance argued 
that by persevering, Muslims and Arabs could 
stand up to both the United States (as in Iraq and 
Afghanistan) and Israel. Peace with Israel meant 
capitulation and was to be avoided. Israel’s unila-
teral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza were 
touted as prime examples of the ability to defeat 
Israel and as harbingers of its ouster from the 
whole of Palestine.
Syria’s main contribution to Iran’s efforts during 
these years was by affording it access to Lebanon 
and Gaza (by hosting the external headquarters 
of Hamas in Damascus). Asad and his team knew 
full well that Hizballah was ultimately an arm of 
the Iranian regime, but they saw it also as an ally 
in preserving Syria’s own position in Lebanon. 
They were instrumental in building Hizballah’s 
huge arsenals of missiles and rockets. This arsenal 
was deployed there primarily to deter Israel and 
the United States from attacking Iran’s nuclear 
installations, but it also was seen as part of Syria’s 
own deterrence against Israel.
During his tenure as prime minister, Ariel Sha-
ron had no interest in negotiating with Syria, and 
he rebuffed a number of Syrian attempts to renew 
the dialogue with Israel. After 2003 Bashar al-
Asad’s efforts were motivated at least in part by 
his desire to break the diplomatic siege laid by 
the Bush administration. For Sharon, who was 
focused on the Palestinian issue, this was yet ano-
ther reason to reject the Syrian gambits. Sharon 
had built an excellent working relationship with 
the Bush White House and he did not wish to 
jeopardize it by talking to the president’s bete 
noire. This was also Ehud Olmert’s policy during 
his first year in office, but in February 2007 he 
changed his mind and, as has been described 
in an earlier chapter, authorized Turkey’s prime 
minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to start a media-
tion process with Damascus. This effort lasted for 
almost two years until it collapsed in December 
2008. Olmert copied a page from Asad’s own 
book, and when he found out that Syria and 
North Korea were building a nuclear reactor, he 
sent his air force to destroy it in September 2007. 
Israel refrained from taking credit for this action, 
in part to help Asad overcome the humiliation 
and to keep him from retaliating.
During these years the focus of the Israeli-Syrian 
give and take shifted significantly. In the 1990s the 
concept of a prospective Israeli-Syrian peace deal 
was modeled on Israel’s peace with Egypt. Predi-
cated on the principle of territories for peace, the 
core of the deal would be full withdrawal from 
the Golan in return for a (cold) peace agreement 
and a security regime. By the early 2000s the cru-
cial issue for Israel was Syria’s intimate alliance 
with Iran and the manifestations of that alliance 
in Lebanon and Gaza. Israel, without abando-
ning the expectation of peace and normalization, 
began to insist that Syria had to disengage from 
Iran and end its support for Hizballah and the 
radical Palestinian organizations if it wanted an 
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. It is precisely 
this state of affairs that turned Israel’s national 
security establishment into the chief advocate of 
an Israeli-Syrian deal. Looking at Israel’s national 
security challenges, the leaders of this establish-
ment argued in recent years that an agreement 
with Syria would be a crucial step in the effort to 
dismantle the challenge presented by Iran and in 
loosening Hizballah’s stranglehold on Lebanon.
This view is not shared by Prime Minister Neta-
nyahu. As a previous chapter noted, during his 
first term in the 1990s, he tried to shift from the 
Palestinian track to the Syrian one by employing 
his friend Ronald Lauder as an emissary to Syria. 
But in his 2009 election campaign, and once in 
office, he was consistent in rejecting the idea of 
withdrawal from the Golan. In January 2009 
George W. Bush, Asad’s foe, was replaced in 
the White House by Barack Obama, who in his 
own election campaign had promised “to engage” 
with Syria (as well as with Iran). As president, 
however, Obama invested his major effort on the 
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Palestinian track. He failed in his attempt to per-
suade Damascus to remain patient and settle for 
the time being on an improvement in Syria’s bila-
teral relationship with Washington.
Israel’s ambivalence toward Bashar al-Asad and 
his regime cut deep. The Israeli leadership was 
fully aware of the damage Syria inflicted on 
Israel in Lebanon and Gaza and by the destruc-
tive potential of a regime that had tried once to 
acquire nuclear weapons. But when confronted 
with the prospect of a regime change, Israelis 
ponder whether the current regime may not be 
preferable to the alternative, whether that is a 
regime dominated b Islamists or a long period 
of instability. After all, it was an unstable Syria 
that triggered the May 1967 crisis. In 2005, when 
President Bush seemed to be targeting Bashar 
al-Asad and his regime, his Israeli partners were 
not enthusiastic. In 2011, when the Arab Spring 
reached Syria and serious protests erupted, Israe-
lis were once again uncertain what to think. They 
saw the weakening of the Iranian camp as a net 
gain but were not at all convinced that Asad’s 
putative fall would be in Israel’s immediate inte-
rest. This did not prevent Asad, when he finally 
addressed his people on March 30, from arguing 
that the unrest in Syria was not a domestic phe-
nomenon but a conspiracy hatched from the out-
side by the United States and Israel. Israelis could 
only wish that they had such influence on the 
course of events in Syria.
On May 10, 2011, as the pressure on Asad’s 
regime mounted, his cousin, Rami Makhluf, gave 
an unusual interview to the New York Times in 
which he threatened, among other things, that 
there would be no stability in Israel if there was 
no stability in Syria. Four days later, on what 
they call Nakba Day, hundreds of Palestinian 
demonstrators in Syria, clearly encouraged by the 
Asad regime, broke through the fence to Majdal 
Shams, a Druze village in the Golan Heights. It 
was the first serious infringement of Syria’s 1974 
Disengagement Agreement with Israel and also 
a message from the Asad regime that it did not 
intend to go down quietly.
In 2000, after the failure of the Clinton-Asad 
meeting in Geneva and before Hafiz al Asad’s 
death, the Syrian intellectual Sadiq al-’Azm 
published an essay in the New York Review of 
Books in which he asserted that the Syrian public 
(by which he meant primarily Damascene society) 
had accepted the notion of peace with Israel.8 The 
only remaining question, he said, was when the 
peace would be negotiated. (Al-’Azm’s concept of 
peace was a different matter; it was quite far from 
Israel’s most modest concept of peace with Syria.) 
Al-’Azm is well known as an independent, cou-
rageous intellectual and definitely does not speak 
for the Ba’ath regime, but his essay should be read 
with an awareness of the limits of free expression 
in Syria, particularly regarding such a sensitive 
issue as peacemaking with Israel.
Eleven years after its publication, al-’Azm’s essay 
can be read with more than a touch of irony. It 
seems far removed from the present realities. But 
it remains significant. Present realities can change 
swiftly and dramatically—as the 2011 events in 
the Arab world demonstrated— and the deep 
currents of Syrian public opinion could once 
again become relevant.
Lebanon
In the 1950s and 1960s a political cliché was cur-
rent in Israel to the effect that “Lebanon will be 
the second Arab state to sign a peace with Israel,” 
simply because Lebanon did not have the regio-
nal clout to be the first. The cliché, clearly not 
borne out by the course of events, was inspired 
by earlier contacts between Zionist diplomats 
and some Maronite Christian leaders in Leba-
non and on a mistaken perception of the nature 
of Lebanese politics. Many Lebanese Christians 
thought of Israel as another non-Muslim state 
that was or could be a bulwark against pan-Arab 
nationalism—and thus Israelis thought of them 
as potential allies. But most of these Christians 
also viewed Lebanon as a part of the Arab world 
and wanted to preserve the delicate domestic and 
external balances so indispensable to Lebanon’s 
precarious survival.9
Those balances were upset in the early 1970s, and 
the Lebanese state and political system essenti-
ally collapsed during the 1975–76 civil war. From 
Israel’s perspective, the civil war and lingering cri-
sis in Lebanon had several negative results: the 
Lebanese state was incapable of exercising autho-
rity over Lebanese territory, Syria had become the 
paramount power and military presence in Leba-
non, and the Palestinians built a territorial base in 
Beirut and southern Lebanon under the PLO’s 
direction. Israel eventually responded in various 
ways: a tactical indirect understanding with Syria 
to preclude a Syrian military presence in southern 
Lebanon, an Israeli “security strip” inside Leba-
The Web of Relationship 11/26
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2012-04
non, and a strategic alliance with several Maro-
nite groups in Lebanon. But the Lebanese front 
was the main arena of the PLO’s armed conflict 
with Israel during the 1970s. The growing Palesti-
nian and Syrian challenge and a misguided belief 
that Israel could place a friendly government in 
Beirut and change the strategic configuration in 
the region led Menachem Begin’s government to 
invade Lebanon in 1982.
For both Lebanon and Israel, the 1982 war had 
momentous, mostly unintended consequences. 
The PLO’s leaders and troops were forced to 
move to Tunisia; Syria’s hold over Lebanon, after 
an initial setback, was reinforced; and the Chris-
tian communities preserved some of their politi-
cal privileges but lost much of their power. But 
the war’s single most important outcome was the 
acceleration of a process that had been apparent 
earlier: the mobilization of the hitherto under-
privileged Shiite community and its quest for a 
political position commensurate with its demo-
graphic strength in Lebanon. This trend was rein-
forced when Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979 was 
projected into Lebanon and its Shiite community, 
so far its only successful foreign destination.10 
The Shiite militias of Amal and Hizballah were 
propelled not by nationalism but by religion, and 
they introduced into the conflict such then-novel 
elements as suicide bombings.
By 1985 Israel had given up any claim to figure 
in Lebanon’s national politics and focused on the 
defense of its northern frontier. It withdrew to an 
expanded security zone in south Lebanon main-
tained by the Israeli Defense Forces with the help 
of a local militia. After that point, the security 
zone and occasionally Israel itself were attacked 
primarily by Hizballah, under direction from 
Tehran and with the tacit cooperation of Syria.
In October 1989 an Arab conference held in Taif, 
Saudi Arabia, tried to consolidate and forma-
lize the situation. The compromise embodied in 
the Taif Accord envisaged Syria’s military with-
drawal from Lebanon, albeit as a remote pros-
pect. But the accord remained a dead letter. In 
fact, Syria took advantage of its participation in 
the American-led coalition during the 1990–91 
Persian Gulf crisis and Gulf War to consolidate 
its hold over Lebanon, fourteen years after its ori-
ginal invasion in response to the civil war. Syria 
finally controlled Lebanon through a functioning 
local government—maintaining a significant 
military presence there not as an army of occu-
pation but as a guarantor of its hegemony, as a 
defender of the western approaches to Damascus, 
and as a potential threat to Israel. Syria made a 
point of acting as the guardian of the trappings 
of Lebanese statehood, but in subtle and less-
than-subtle ways it ensured Lebanon’s acquies-
cence with its will and interests. Thus, no progress 
was to be made in Lebanese-Israeli negotiations 
so long as a breakthrough had not occurred in 
Syrian-Israeli relations. Syria undertook, once 
such a breakthrough occurred, to obtain a com-
parable agreement for Lebanon, and Lebanon’s 
territory was to be used to pressure Israel to come 
to terms with Syria.
In 1994 the broad lines of an understanding about 
Lebanon were, in fact, worked out between Israel 
and Syria through their ambassadors in Washing-
ton. Provided that a Syrian-Israeli agreement was 
reached, Syria was willing to endorse an Israeli-
Lebanese peace agreement to be implemented 
within nine months—a time frame that coincided 
with the nine months that Rabin envisaged in his 
discussions with Secretary of State Christopher 
for the first phase of a prospective agreement 
with Syria. But no such agreement was reached.
Unfortunately, there was also a violent side to 
this story. Hizballah’s offensive against Israel’s 
security zone in southern Lebanon and occasio-
nal Katyusha rocket attacks on northern Israel 
kept up a permanent cycle of violence along the 
Lebanese-Israeli border. Twice—in July 1993 
and April 1996—Israel launched large-scale land 
operations in Lebanon in an effort to break the 
cycle. Both operations led to “understandings” 
between Israel and Hizballah that limited the 
violence but failed to end it.
Soon after the formation of his government 
in June 1996, Netanyahu sought to promote a 
“Lebanon first” initiative, which he hoped would 
win Syrian endorsement. But Syria suspec-
ted this effort was an attempt to drive a wedge 
between Damascus and Beirut and wasted no 
time in rebuffing the gambit. That September, a 
redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon led to 
a brief war scare, when some in Israel wrongly 
interpreted it as a preparation for launching an 
attack, and Syrians then wrongly interpreted 
Israel’s statements and responsive movements as 
preparations for an attack. Eventually, reassuring 
messages were exchanged and a confrontation 
was averted, but the episode showed how explo-
sive the Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese triangle was.
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As the months went by and the number of Israeli 
casualties grew dramatically, so did public and 
political pressure to extricate Israeli soldiers from 
southern Lebanon. A mixed coalition of concer-
ned parents, left-wing politicians, and Golan 
settlers who were eager to sever the diplomatic 
link between southern Lebanon and the Golan 
Heights led a movement calling for Israel’s uni-
lateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Netanyahu’s 
government responded with a novel tactic—a 
conditional acceptance of Security Council Reso-
lution 425, which in 1978 had required Israel to 
leave Lebanon after an earlier intervention. This 
put Lebanon’s President Elias Harawi and Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri in a difficult position: it was 
hard for them to explain why they were refusing 
to take Israel up on its offer to withdraw. Their 
predicament enhanced Syria’s suspicions that 
they might seek accommodation with Israel on 
their own, and Syria made highly visible efforts 
to keep Lebanon’s government in tow.
As has been described above, this state of affairs 
was transformed by Ehud Barak’s decision to 
withdraw the IDF from south Lebanon, a deci-
sion that was implemented in May–June 2000. 
Barak took care to execute the withdrawal in 
close coordination with the United Nations (not a 
common practice in Israel’s diplomatic tradition) 
and obtained the UN’s stamp of approval for the 
completion of Israel’s withdrawal to the interna-
tional boundary. But Hizballah, and subsequently 
the government of Lebanon, complained that 
Israel’s failure to withdraw from the Shaba Farms 
and the village of Ghajar (Syrian territory accor-
ding to Israel and the UN) and Israeli overflights 
constituted ongoing acts of aggression. Hizballah 
used these complaints to justify the maintenance 
of regular low-level pressure on Israel’s northern 
borders with occasional outbursts of more spec-
tacular attacks.
Hizballah continued its campaign against Israel 
on two levels. It used its complaints about Israel’s 
“aggression” and other open-ended issues to legi-
timize its claim that the resistance had to conti-
nue, and to argue that Hizballah was a more effec-
tive defender of Lebanon than the country’s army 
and therefore could not be asked to disarm. On a 
deeper level, it acted as a spearhead of the larger 
resistance axis in the Middle East on Iran’s behalf 
to demonstrate that there was no point in coming 
to terms with America and Israel and that perse-
verance was bound to end in victory. With help 
from Iran and Syria, Hizballah built a massive 
arsenal of rockets and missiles, a small but well-
trained military force, and an extensive military 
infrastructure in south Lebanon, stretching all the 
way to the Israeli border. Following Israel’s with-
drawal from south Lebanon in 2000, Hizballah 
staged occasional attacks against Israel, seeking 
first and foremost to abduct Israeli soldiers. One 
such attack in July 2006 triggered the 2006 war.
Lebanon went through several twists and turns 
during the 2000s, but by the decade’s end, several 
trends and facts seem to have been established. 
Iran and Syria were the paramount external 
powers in Lebanon, and with their help Hizbal-
lah established itself as the paramount political 
force in the country. The March 14 Coalition, 
with American and French backing, did well in 
the elections of 2005 and won a less impressive 
victory in the election of 2009. In 2010, howe-
ver, Hizballah, after demonstrating in a brief 
confrontation that it could, if it wanted, take over 
the government by force, was able to use politi-
cal pressure to topple the government of Sa’d al-
Hariri (the son of the assassinated former prime 
minister) and to form a cabinet headed by Najib 
Miqati, a Syrian political client.
For its part, Syria had been forced to end its long 
occupation of Lebanon in 2005 after Rafiq Hari-
ri’s assassination. But Syria’s ouster was never 
complete, and it regained its position, though not 
its military presence, by the end of the decade. 
Likewise, Iran, by building and rebuilding Hiz-
ballah’s massive arsenal of rockets and missiles, 
obtained the ability to retaliate against Israel’s 
cities and infrastructure in the event of an Ameri-
can or Israeli attack on its nuclear installations—
as well as to provoke a major crisis at will.
Israel faced these developments with mounting 
concern. The moderate Lebanese parliamentary 
republic had flourished and been a harmless 
neighbor during the decades when a balance of 
domestic and external forces sustained its unique 
pluralistic system. But if the current trends conti-
nue and Lebanon remains dominated and shaped 
by Hizballah with the support of Iran and Syria, 
Israel and Lebanon face the danger of additional, 
far more destructive wars and the added danger 
of becoming outright enemies. The Israeli policy 
of distinguishing between a benevolent Lebanon 
and the hostile elements that operate from its ter-
ritory may no longer remain valid.
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Jordan
Israel shares its longest border with Jordan, and 
the two countries have immense actual and 
potential impact on each other’s national secu-
rity and economy. Their relationship, however, is, 
and for a long time has been, primarily affected 
by their respective and common relations with a 
third party—the Palestinians.
Jordan’s very birth as a modern state was inti-
mately linked to this issue. When Great Britain 
decided in 1921 to create ex nihilo a principality 
for the Hashemite potentate Amir Abdullah, it 
needed to placate him personally and the Hashe-
mite family in general for what the family consi-
dered a betrayal—their receipt of only a meager 
share in the postwar settlement in the Middle 
East. Britain’s solution was to detach the East 
Bank of the Jordan River from the territory of 
Mandate Palestine and turn it into the Emirate 
of Transjordan. In doing so, Britain was also 
trying to reduce the impact that the formation of 
the promised Jewish “national home” in Palestine 
would have on the region.
During the next twenty-five years, Abdullah, 
with British help, developed a genuine polity in 
Jordan, and in 1946 his principality became a 
kingdom. At the same time, a significant political 
relationship grew between Abdullah and the lea-
ders of the Jewish community in prestate Israel, 
the Yishuv. This understanding was predicated 
on their common enmity to radical Palestinian-
Arab nationalism, as personified by Haj Amin 
al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem. Abdullah was 
hostile not merely to the mufti personally but to 
his political style and to the brand of Arab natio-
nalism that he represented. Never satisfied with 
the desert principality assigned to him, Abdullah 
also was eager to extend his rule to more signifi-
cant territories and cities—Syria and Damascus, 
or Palestine west of the Jordan, and Jerusalem.
When the idea of partitioning Palestine into 
Jewish and Arab states came to the fore in 1937, 
a new dimension was added to Abdullah’s rela-
tionship with the Yishuv. If this partition came 
to pass, he might assume the Arab leading role 
on Palestine and provide the stability and prag-
matism that had been so glaringly absent from 
the scene. The term “Jordanian option” was coi-
ned later, but the concept originated then: the 
solution of Israel’s Palestinian dilemma by means 
of Jordan. This option became a viable after the 
UN’s partition resolution of November 1947.
The Jewish leaders had accepted the notion of 
Palestine’s partition and were quite content to go 
along with part of Abdullah’s annexation plan. 
But they disliked what became another aspect 
of Abdullah’s policy: his part in the Arab states’ 
invasion of Palestine on May 15, 1948, the day 
after the founding of the state of Israel. By par-
ticipating in that war, Abdullah sought to facili-
tate his own takeover of the area assigned to be a 
Palestinian-Arab state in the UN’s partition plan.
During the war, Abdullah’s army, the Arab 
Legion, was a resolute and effective enemy that 
inflicted on the young Israeli Defense Forces some 
of its most painful defeats, and at the war’s end 
Abdullah was indeed in control of what became 
known as the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
His annexation of these territories was formally 
recognized by only two foreign governments, but, 
whatever the legal aspects, it transformed the 
Jordanian polity. (The kingdom was called Trans-
jordan until 1964 and Jordan thereafter.) Palesti-
nians now made up a majority of its population; 
many of them regarded Abdullah, his kingdom, 
and his act of annexation as illegitimate.11 And 
in the years before Abdullah was assassinated by 
a Palestinian in 1951, the transformation of his 
kingdom’s traditional politics as a consequence 
of the annexation of this large, better-educated, 
politically mobilized, and embittered Palestinian 
population had become apparent. In 1949–50, 
a treaty between Israel and Jordan was negotia-
ted and initialed but was not finalized, because 
Abdullah realized that he had neither the power 
nor the de facto authority to carry his country 
with him to a peace settlement with Israel.12
During the next fifteen years, the issue for Jordan 
was not territorial annexation but survival. Fol-
lowing a brief regency period, the eighteenyear- 
old Hussein ascended the throne that he was to 
occupy for fortyfive years. The young monarch 
proved to be extremely determined, astute in 
maintaining external support and facing down 
domestic opposition, and unusually skillful and 
lucky at aborting plots and evading assassination 
attempts. By this point, revolutionary Arab natio-
nalism (as exemplified by Egypt) held sway over 
much of the Middle East, and the king’s Pales-
tinian subjects were among its staunchest sup-
porters. Yet at the same time, Jordan, reflecting 
the new demographic realities and in keeping 
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with its claim to embody the Palestinian issue, 
was the only Arab state that offered citizenship 
to Palestinians. In 1967 King Hussein joined 
Egypt and Syria in their war against Israel, and 
he paid dearly by losing the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem. Jordan now had no West Bank but a 
Palestinian majority in the East Bank; yet by then 
many Palestinians had been “Jordanianized” and 
had come to accept Jordan as their country and 
state. Yearning for Palestinian self-determination 
was one thing, and the realization that life under 
the Hashemites is quite attractive was another.13
So, the Six-Day War reopened “the question of 
Palestine.” For the first time since 1949, all of 
the territory that had been Mandate Palestine 
was placed under a single authority. Israel was 
in control of the sizable Palestinian population 
living in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, 
in addition to its own Palestinian Arab minority. 
The debate over the future of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip became the governing issue of 
Israeli politics. For Israel, three principal alterna-
tives presented themselves: reviving the Jordanian 
option; seeking or accepting the creation of an 
independent or autonomous Palestinian entity; 
or perpetuating Israeli control, either as a deli-
berate policy or, more likely, by failing to make 
painful choices.
The Hashemite regime’s initial preference was to 
come to an agreement with Israel, but the king 
insisted that he could do so only on the basis of 
Israel’s full withdrawal from the occupied territo-
ries. With the passage of time, Israel’s attachment 
to the West Bank grew stronger, as did the PLO’s 
stature and power, and so the prospects for this 
Jordanian option waned. Nor did various notions 
of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation turn into a 
magic formula.
Its protestations of formal support notwithstan-
ding, Jordan had consistently opposed or at least 
been uneasy about the idea of a Palestinian state 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For Hashe-
mite Jordan, a small Palestinian state in part of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could not be 
a durable, satisfactory solution to the Palestinian 
problem, and
Palestinians were likely to direct their irreden-
tist claims eastward and to seek the allegiance of 
Jordan’s Palestinian majority. True, many of the 
kingdom’s Palestinian subjects viewed themselves 
as Jordanians, but why expose their loyalty to such 
a challenge?14 So, for many long years, staying 
with the status quo proved to be the easiest 
choice for Jordan, too. A channel of communi-
cation with the Israeli leadership was kept dis-
creetly open (but not publicized) for nearly three 
decades. Several attempts were made to reach a 
settlement, various practical issues were sorted 
out, and a dialogue was maintained between King 
Hussein and most of Israel’s prime ministers. A 
community of interests was established with both 
Labor and Likud leaders, based on shared oppo-
sition to the PLO and to the notion of Palesti-
nian statehood.
One tenet of this relationship—the Israeli belief 
that the survival of the Hashemite regime and its 
control of the East Bank were important Israeli 
national interests—was shaken when, in 1970, 
the Likud adopted the slogan “Jordan is Pales-
tine” and took the position that there was no need 
to establish a second Palestinian state. The argu-
ment also presumed that, once the Palestinians 
took over the reins of government in Amman, 
their claim over the West Bank would weaken.15 
The issue came into stark relief that September, 
when Israel was key in facilitating King Hussein’s 
victory over Syria and the PLO (discussed in 
chapter
1). Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin believed that 
the king’s survival and American-Israeli strategic 
cooperation should be Israel’s paramount conside-
rations; their decision was subsequently criticized 
by Ariel Sharon, leader of Israel’s radical right, 
who argued that the government had missed an 
opportunity “to let nature take its course.”
In the rich chronology of Israeli-Jordanian his-
tory during these years, several defining events 
stand out: King Hussein’s decision not to join 
the Arab war coalition in October 1973; Henry 
Kissinger’s inability to effect an Israeli-Jordanian 
interim agreement in the spring of 1974; the 
Arab summit’s decision in October 1974 to desi-
gnate the PLO (rather than Jordan) as the legi-
timate claimant to the West Bank; the London 
Agreement of April 1987, which was Israel’s last 
attempt to exercise the Jordanian option, albeit 
in a modified version; Jordan’s formal disenga-
gement from the West Bank in 1988;16 and the 
1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and Gulf War, which 
represented the culmination of Iraq’s threat to 
Jordan’s independence.
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The signing in 1993 of the Oslo Accords affected 
this history paradoxically. The Hashemites resen-
ted Israel’s latest choice of a Palestinian option 
but decided that they had to draw closer to Israel, 
the better to affect the course of events. The 
emergence of a Palestinian state had grown more 
likely but was not a foregone conclusion, and Jor-
dan and Israel still shared a significant agenda. 
But there was another side to the same develop-
ments. By signing the Oslo Accords with Israel, 
the PLO enabled Jordan and other Arab states 
to pursue their bilateral agendas with Israel. This 
was not such a simple matter, however, because 
any dealings with Israel ended up involving an 
ever-present third party, the United States. There 
were also complex regional issues to be dealt with, 
such as strategic cooperation with Turkey and the 
future of Iraq.
Meanwhile, Israel’s commitment to the survi-
val of King Hussein’s regime was buttressed by 
a close personal relationship between the king 
and Yitzhak Rabin. This relationship played a 
crucial role in enabling the two states to sign a 
peace agreement in October 1994 and to forma-
lize their relationship. This relationship changed 
during Peres’s brief tenure as Rabin’s successor. 
The king was worried that his policies would 
lead all too quickly to an independent Palestinian 
state and to Israeli-Syrian and Syrian-Lebanese 
agreements; these would jeopardize and dwarf 
Jordan’s position. On the eve of the May 1996 
elections, Jordan indicated its preference for Ben-
jamin Netanyahu and a peace policy managed at 
a more deliberate pace.
Yet these hopes were not fulfilled. For, although 
Jordan was opposed to an accelerated peace pro-
cess, it found a viable one essential, particularly 
vis-à-vis the Palestinians. The collapse of Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations, let alone outbreaks of 
Israeli-Palestinian violence, would make Jordan’s 
peace with Israel hardly tenable. This might have 
been a tall order, but the Hashemites expected 
from Israel finesse and subtlety in the conduct of 
a delicate, fragile relationship. They soon came to 
believe that Netanyahu in the late 1990s was a 
prime minister who could not manage that rela-
tionship, who could not keep the king’s personal 
trust, and whose real intentions with regard to 
the peace process could not be divined. The king 
vented his frustration in a scathing letter to Neta-
nyahu, the text of which became available to the 
international media. Yet the king kept the lid on: 
most of the interests that kept Jordan wanting 
a peace with Israel were still valid, and the cost 
of an open break with Israel still outweighed the 
benefits it might produce. And so, for the time 
being, Israeli-Jordanian peace survived, but the 
expectations of a special relationship, a warm 
peace, and a mutually beneficial web of economic 
and development projects failed to materialize.
In February 1999, King Hussein died of the can-
cer he had fought during the previous few years. 
On his deathbed he removed his brother Hasan, 
who had served as crown prince for more than 
thirty years, and appointed his oldest son, Abdul-
lah, as his heir. After ascending the throne, the 
young king reassured Israel on several occasions 
that he was committed to the peace his father had 
signed. Yet Israeli apprehensions about Jordan’s 
ability to contend with potential and external 
threats were exacerbated by the simultaneous loss 
of two brothers who had been experienced and 
familiar partners.
King Abdullah’s early decisions and the change 
of government in Israel in the late spring of 1999 
improved the atmosphere in the two countries’ 
relationship, but the intimacy and special rela-
tions of the Rabin-Hussein years were not res-
tored. Jordan anxiously watched the new Israeli 
prime minister Barak’s apparently swift progress 
toward far-reaching agreements with Syria and 
the Palestinians (as it had under Peres). It was 
particularly alarmed by Barak’s willingness to 
give up a permanent presence in the Jordan Val-
ley, thereby laying the groundwork for Jordan’s 
uncomfortable contiguity with a future Palesti-
nian state. But in keeping with a long-established 
tradition, Jordan did not express such concerns in 
public and chose to pay lip service to Palestinian 
nationalism.
Jordan must not have lamented the collapse of 
the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation in July 2000. 
But the outbreak in short order of the al-Aqsa 
intifada created new pressures on a state with a 
Palestinian majority that had made and maintai-
ned peace with Israel. Amman lowered the profile 
of its relations with Israel and took security pre-
cautions. It was a tacit source of inspiration for 
what was initially known as the Saudi Initiative 
(adopted at the Beirut Arab Summit of 2002) and 
eventually as the Arab Peace Initiative. Together 
with Egypt, Jordan became the chief promoter of 
this initiative.
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Jordan’s role reflected its growing concern with 
the impact on its own politics of the unresolved 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such events as the al-
Aqsa intifada, the 2006 Lebanon War, and Ope-
ration Cast Lead in Gaza agitated the Palestinian 
majority in Jordan. And as the first decade of the 
twenty-first century wore on, Jordan’s traditional 
anxiety with the repercussions of the potential 
formation of an irredentist Palestinian state gave 
way to growing criticism of Israel for the failure to 
move toward a resolution of the Palestinian issue. 
The king kept the essential elements of the peace 
with Israel, but he and other prominent members 
of the Jordanian establishment made no secret of 
their unhappiness with its policies.17
Early in 2011 the agitation that toppled Tunisia’s 
Ben Ali, Egypt’s Mubarak, and Libya’s Qaddafi 
and that affected large parts of the Arab world 
also rattled the Hashemite regime, if only tem-
porarily. Significantly, many of the chief protes-
tors were not Palestinian but East Bankers, the 
monarchy’s traditional power base.
The Palestinians
In November 1975, a senior State Department 
official and long-time specialist in Arab affairs, 
Harold Saunders, testified at a hearing held by the 
a subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. In his prepared 
written text, Saunders referred to the Palestinian 
issue as the core of the conflict between Arabs 
and Israelis in the Middle East.18 At the time, 
little attention was paid to Saunders’s testimony, 
but it subsequently drew considerable attention 
and animated objections from Israel’s govern-
ment. Israel was then in the midst of a complex 
diplomatic process orchestrated by the United 
States and predicated on the assumption that the 
key to the Arab-Israeli conflict lay in Israel’s rela-
tions with the major Arab states. Saunders’s argu-
ment ran against the grain of U.S.-Israeli policies 
and was, indeed, a harbinger of the change that 
came with the subsequent Carter presidency. If 
the Palestinian issue was the core question of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, did it not make sense 
to predicate the quest for Arab-Israeli peace on 
a resolution of the problem that lay at its heart? 
Indeed, the Carter administration, and Saun-
ders as its top Middle East diplomat, acted in 
the Middle East on the dual assumption that it 
could resolve the Palestinian problem and that its 
success would offer the key to a comprehensive 
Arab-Israeli peace.
But was such a resolution feasible? Since 1948 
Israeli attitudes toward the Palestinians were to 
a large extent shaped by a sense that the Israeli- 
Palestinian dispute is a zero-sum game, that 
Palestinian demands and expectations could 
be met only on intolerable terms. It was much 
easier for Israel and Israelis to think of Israeli-
Arab reconciliation by means of negotiations and 
agreements with states like Egypt, Jordan, and 
Syria, which could focus on such issues as boun-
daries and water.19
This frame of mind was for many years reinforced 
by the course of Palestinian history and the drift 
of Palestinian politics. Between 1949 and 1964, 
the Palestinians were absent from the Middle 
Eastern arena as an independent force. They were 
crushed, fragmented, and dispersed. Their tradi-
tional leaders were discredited, and most young 
Palestinian activists invested their zeal in ideolo-
gical parties that promised a remedy to the Pales-
tinian predicament within a larger, pan-Arabic 
scheme. The Arab states, in turn, were eager to 
assume control of the Palestinian issue and to 
suppress the efforts made by Palestinian groups to 
take charge themselves. For more than a decade, 
the vast majority of them were under the spell of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and his brand of messianic 
pan-Arab nationalism. They believed that when 
Nasser defeated the enemy—the unholy trinity 
of Western imperialism, Zionism, and domestic 
reactionary forces—and united the Arab home-
land, Arab Palestine also would be liberated and 
redeemed. It was only with Nasser’s and Nasse-
rism’s decline in the late 1960’s that an authentic 
Palestinian national movement could assert itself.
The PLO was founded by the Arab states in 1964 
as their instrument, but was taken over in 1968 by 
the authentic Palestinian groups that had emer-
ged a few years earlier. Yet, for another twenty-
five years, most Israelis did not consider the PLO 
an acceptable interlocutor. It had drafted a char-
ter that called for Israel’s destruction, and it used 
terror as a principal instrument to achieve that 
end. All efforts to persuade the PLO’s leader, Yas-
ser Arafat, to take positions that would enable the 
PLO to join the peace process in the 1970s were 
to no avail. The PLO only slowly adopted the 
formula of a two-state solution. Nor was Israel, 
the more powerful party to the conflict, ready or 
willing to take the initiative.20
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Thus, while Israel and Egypt went ahead toward 
their peace treaty of 1979, armed conflict 
between Israel and Palestinian nationalists and 
their struggle over the land of the West Bank 
continued. The ambivalence and equivocation 
about building Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank that marked Israel’s Labor governments 
was replaced after the Likud victory in 1977 
with open encouragement to do so. These efforts 
created (mostly by design) a new reality under 
which a workable compromise with the Palesti-
nians became ever more difficult to achieve., Yet 
at the same time, the sight of expanding Israeli 
settlements persuaded many Palestinians, parti-
cularly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that 
time was not necessarily on their side and that 
reaching a settlement was imperative.
In 1988 Arafat finally endorsed the principle 
of a two-state solution, and on that basis diplo-
macy began between the PLO and the United 
States. The changes of position in Washington 
and the PLO amplified the considerable impact 
of the intifada, which began later that year, and 
increased the pressure on Israel’s second natio-
nal unity government to renew, after a seven-
year hiatus, negotiations about Palestinian self-
rule. The profound disagreement between the 
government’s Labor and Likud components over 
this issue expedited the collapse of the talks in 
March 1990. When Israeli-Palestinian negotia-
tions began again in 1991, they were part of the 
Madrid process, and they played out against the 
backdrop of other great changes: the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the 
Persian Gulf crisis and Gulf War, and a fresh 
wave of emigrants from the former Soviet Union 
to Israel.
In the course of putting the Madrid process 
together, Secretary of State James Baker discove-
red that Prime Minister Shamir’s resistance to the 
very notion of negotiating with the Palestinians 
could be mitigated by shifting emphasis from the 
Palestinian issue to a parallel channel of diplo-
macy with Israel’s Arab neighbors. This blun-
ted the Palestinian edge of the Madrid process, 
which was further reduced by the formal incor-
poration of the Palestinian delegation into a Jor-
danian-Palestinian delegation. The junior status 
thus assigned to the Palestinians, and the PLO’s 
formal absence from the Madrid process, reflec-
ted the PLO’s decline in the Arab world after the 
Gulf War, though the effect of this humiliating 
turn of events was limited at first, since no pro-
gress occurred during the first nine months of the 
post-Madrid negotiations. But when the Rabin 
government was formed, the PLO’s hold over 
Palestinian politics acquired fresh significance. 
An Israeli-Palestinian agreement became a key to 
any progress; whether Israel would come to such 
an agreement without the PLO or deal with the 
PLO and find an acceptable formula became a 
crucial issue on its diplomatic agenda.
We have seen how Rabin pondered the compa-
rative advantages of the Syrian and Palestinian 
options. In early August 1993, the hypothetical 
vacillation turned into an actual policy choice. 
Then, by signing the Oslo Accords, Israel predi-
cated the new phase of the peace process on its 
agreement with the PLO, and not with a major 
Arab state such as Syria. This action resulted in 
a radical change of perspective. Having signed 
a framework agreement with representatives of 
Palestinian nationalism, Israel now argued that 
the core issue of the Arab- Israeli conflict had 
been addressed and the chief obstacle to Arab-
Israeli reconciliation and normalization had been 
removed. A hitherto unfamiliar mutual depen-
dence was created between the government of 
Israel and the PLO leaders.
The Oslo process was a very complex and fragile 
mechanism; genuine cooperation and a genuine 
sense of partnership were indispensable to its 
success. As we have seen, these were achieved to 
only a limited degree.
Moreover, the signing of the Oslo agreement 
did not mean that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
was over. In both societies, powerful forces were 
opposed to reconciliation and continued to try 
to abort it. Competition for control of the West 
Bank and Jerusalem continued, and the leaders, 
cooperating as they did in implementing the 
agreements they had signed, still had very diffe-
rent visions of the final-status agreement. Both 
societies had yet to think through, separately or 
together, some fundamental issues. Were Israel 
and the Palestinians interested in separation, or in 
some form of cooperation or integration within 
the Israeli- Jordanian-Palestinian triangle? 
And if separation was what they wanted, was it 
feasible? What sort of relationship could be envi-
saged between societies separated by such social 
and economic gaps? How would as many as fif-
teen million Israelis and Arabs share the limited 
resources of land and water in the space between 
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the Mediterranean and the Jordan early in the 
next century?
The Oslo process ran its course during the 1990s 
without the Israeli- Palestinian dispute being 
resolved. We have seen how Benjamin Neta-
nyahu failed to maneuver among the forces that 
buffeted his Palestinian policy, and how Ehud 
Barak shifted from the preference he had assig-
ned to the Syrian track to the boldest effort yet by 
any Israeli leader to reach a final, comprehensive 
agreement with the Palestinian national move-
ment. The collapse of Barak’s negotiations with 
Arafat and the outbreak of violence in September 
2000 set the stage for a resumption of a fullblown 
conflict between the two protagonists.
The Palestinian-Israeli war of attrition in 2000–03 
(commonly known as the second intifada) exac-
ted a high toll from both parties. Coupled with 
an economic crisis of the same years, this period 
was one of the darkest in Israel’s history. The war 
also inflicted heavy damage on the Palestinians 
and eliminated many of the gains made during 
the 1990s. Israel won the war, but the military 
victory did not resolve the broader conflict. Ara-
fat’s death in November 2004 was preceded by 
political decline for two of the entities he headed: 
the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah move-
ment. He was criticized by many Palestinians for 
resorting to violence and subjecting them to its 
consequences, and he was gradually emasculated 
by Sharon’s siege of his compound in Ramallah 
and his own physical decline.
The Bush administration’s original effort to dimi-
nish Arafat’s role and provide the Palestinian 
Authority with a different type of government 
could now be implemented. With Mamud Abbas 
as president and Salam Fayyad as prime minis-
ter, the Palestinian Authority mounted a new 
track. Fayyad became the real leader of the effort 
to build a clean, accountable government and, 
with U.S. help, an effective security force to com-
bat terrorism. In Fayyad’s vision, this was to be a 
bottom-up effort to create the foundations of a 
Palestinian state. Israel saw in Fayyad an excellent 
partner, but at a certain point the interests of the 
two parties diverged. Fayyad was determined to 
achieve statehood, and if Israel did not accommo-
date him, he was ready to take unilateral action.
But “Fayyadism” was only part of the picture. 
Fatah did not undergo a process of reform and 
was seen by many Palestinians as tired and cor-
rupt. When the Bush administration insisted on 
free elections in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas 
won, in January 2006. After a prolonged period 
of political uncertainty, Hamas in June 2007 
staged a violent coup and took control of Gaza. 
The Palestinian polity was now divided physically 
and ideologically. Hamas, an Islamist movement, 
rejects the notion of a final status agreement with 
Israel. Hamas’s impact is matched to some extent 
by the decline of secular Palestinian support for 
the idea of a two-state solution, since that solu-
tion proved to be so elusive. Quite a few Palesti-
nian intellectuals and political activists have come 
to the conclusion that, ultimately, time is on their 
side and that in a decade or so a “one-state solu-
tion” could become a reality.
Hamas presents Israel with a manifold challenge. 
It is firmly in control of the Gaza Strip and, as we 
saw, Israel has failed to come up with a solution to 
the “problem of Gaza.” Hamas was weakened, at 
least temporarily by the Syrian crisis of 2011, but 
it remains closely allied to Iran and is a benefi-
ciary of Egypt’s current weakness. It continues to 
challenge Fatah’s hold over the West Bank and to 
present an alternative strategy that many Pales-
tinians find attractive. As long as Hamas is in 
control of Gaza, any agreement that Israel might 
make with Abbas can be implemented only in the 
West Bank, with Hamas possessing the ability to 
obstruct it by restarting a cycle of violence from 
the Gaza Strip.
In 2008, during the final phase of his tenure, 
Ehud Olmert negotiated with Abbas and went 
even further than Barak did in 2000 (see above). 
Abbas did not respond to Olmert’s final offer. 
Abbas and other Palestinians have since explai-
ned that there was less to the offer than met the 
eye and that there was no point in signing a deal 
with a departing Israeli prime minister. This may 
be true, but Abbas has yet to demonstrate that he 
is willing to offer Israel finality, an end of claims 
and acceptance of Israel as the Jewish people’s 
national state in return for Israeli willingness to 
accept a Palestinian state with a territory compa-
rable to the 1967 lines and a capital in Jerusalem.
The quest for a renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiation was reinforced by Barack Obama’s 
election as America’s new president. The new 
president made the resolution of this conflict a 
priority, an important component of his effort to 
ameliorate the tension between the United States 
and the Muslim and Arab worlds. But Obama 
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also encountered a right-wing Israeli govern-
ment that was once again headed by Benjamin 
Netanyahu. The Israeli electorate that had elec-
ted Ehud Olmert in 2006 on a dovish platform 
was pushed to the right by the Iranian threat 
and by the impact of the 2006 Lebanon War, 
Hamas’s control of Gaza and operation cast led 
in 2008–09. Prime Minister Netanyahu grudgin-
gly accepted the notion of Palestinian statehood, 
but that did not suffice to get the process restar-
ted. Nor was it certain that Obama could find a 
willing and effective Palestinian partner for his 
effort. For much of 2011, the Palestinian prefe-
rence seemed to be adoption by the UN General 
Assembly of a resolution that would recognize a 
Palestinian state in the lines of 1967. The impact 
of the Arab Spring of 2011 on Palestinian poli-
tics and on the Palestinian-Israeli equation was 
also unclear. President Obama and others sug-
gested that it actually made an Israeli-Palestinian 
deal more urgent and more feasible. Netanyahu’s 
government and quite a few Palestinians argued 
that major decisions could not be made in times 
of flux and uncertainty. In Gaza the Hamas lea-
dership was biding its time, hoping that the kin-
dred Muslim Brotherhood would become more 
influential in Egypt. Both the Fatah and Hamas 
leaderships were concerned that their constituen-
cies might be affected by the prevailing mood 
in the Arab world and take to the streets, while 
Israel was concerned that the same mood could 
lead to a third intifada.
From “Israeli Arabs” 
to“Israel’s Palestinian 
Citizens”
In the original terminology of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, the conflict in and over British  Mandate 
Palestine was conducted between an Arab side 
and a Jewish side. It was only after the establish-
ment of the state of Israel and the conclusion of 
the 1948 war that a stark distinction was drawn 
between Israelis and Palestinians as the suc-
cessors of the Jewish and Arab communities in 
Palestine. In Israeli usage, the term “Arab” came 
to refer to the people who lived in the larger Arab 
world beyond Israel’s borders, while the term 
“Palestinian” referred to Palestinians residing 
outside Israel. Israel’s own Arab or Palestinian 
citizens were strictly referred to as “Israeli Arabs,” 
as members of Israel’s “Arab minority” or “sector.” 
This curious choice of terms well expressed Israe-
lis’ uneasiness about the Palestinian issue. It was, 
in a way, easier to cope with a national minority 
pertaining to an amorphous Arab world than 
with a people who laid specific claim to Israel’s 
own land.21 For twenty years or so, Israel’s Arab 
citizens accepted this terminology and used it 
themselves, but by the 1970s, they began to refer 
to themselves as Palestinians or as Palestinians 
who happened to be Israeli citizens. This was but 
one of many profound changes in the complex 
relationship between the Israeli state and its Arab 
citizens.
When the 1948 war ended, some 160,000 Palesti-
nian Arabs remained in the territory of the inde-
pendent Jewish state and became its citizens. As 
a result, the fledgling state of Israel had a popula-
tion of just over one million, and its Arab citizens 
constituted a minority of about 15 percent. In 
the aftermath of a brutal war, the victorious Jews 
considered this Arab minority as a potential fifth 
column, liable to be used by a hostile Arab world 
in an inevitable, imminent “second round.” This 
underlying attitude was translated into a policy 
of control embodied first and foremost by the 
imposition of a system of military government on 
the Arab population, which was abolished only in 
1966 by Israel’s third prime minister, Levi Eshkol.
This policy of control was carried out in an ambi-
valent context. Israel was hard put to decide 
whether as a Jewish state it wanted to separate 
the Arab minority from the mainstream of Israeli 
public life or, as a democratic state dominated by a 
social-democratic political establishment, to inte-
grate it. Ironically, integration was first accom-
plished, after a fashion, in the political realm. As 
full-fledged citizens of the state of Israel (though 
not as truly equal members of Israel’s body politic 
and society), most Israeli Arabs voted for Zionist 
parties through satellite political party lists and, 
in fact, helped to perpetuate Labor’s hegemony.
During these early years, the Arab minority, pre-
dominantly rural and Muslim, can best be des-
cribed as powerless, traumatized, and confused. 
Its members had to adjust to defeat, to minority 
status, and to isolation from the other parts of 
the fragmented Palestinian community and from 
the larger Arab world. There also was an acute 
problem of leadership: the pre-1948 Palestinian 
Arab elites were now beyond Israel’s borders 
(for example, in East Jerusalem), and those who 
had stayed tended to be poorer and less educa-
ted. Arab political opinion and activity in Israel 
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spanned a spectrum that went from pragmatic 
acceptance of the reality of the Jewish state to 
nationalist opposition to and rejection of it. Prag-
matism was manifested by most Arabs’ voting 
for the major Zionist parties, and opposition was 
manifested primarily through the Communist 
Party. Attempts to form a local Arab nationalist 
party (notably a grouping called Al-Ard, or The 
Land) collapsed when faced with an insurmoun-
table obstacle: to qualify as such, the party would 
adopt a platform negating Israel’s very existence 
and legitimacy as a Jewish state, and then the 
government and courts would label it seditious. 
A subtler, politically easier way for members of 
the intellectual Arab elite in Israel to express their 
rejection of the Israeli state was in literary prose 
and verse.
As in so many other respects, 1967 was a watershed 
year in the evolution of Israel’s Arab minority. The 
reemergence of an authentic and effective Pales-
tinian nationalist movement and the removal of 
the physical barrier that had once separated them 
from the Palestinian and Arab worlds beyond 
Israel’s borders induced a process of Palestinia-
nization. But the balance that had been achieved 
in practice between Israeli and Arab nationalist 
components in the community was upset. It was 
a measure of this change that the term “Israeli 
Arab” was discarded, and Israel’s Arab citizens 
came to refer to themselves as Palestinians. This 
nationalist awakening, coupled with socioecono-
mic improvements—a higher standard of living, 
a higher level of education, the partial breakdown 
of the extended-family system, the transforma-
tion of several villages into towns—led to a new 
phase of political activism. On March 30, 1976, 
a massive protest was organized, under the title 
The Day of the Land, against the expropriation 
of Arab-owned land in the Galilee (in northern 
Israel). In clashes with security forces, six people 
were killed. March 30 became an annual day of 
protest for Palestinians in Israel and in the West 
Bank and Gaza.
Yasser Arafat and the PLO turned the day into 
an all-Palestinian event, but as a rule the PLO 
did not view Israel’s Arab minority as part of 
its constituency. Long before the PLO formally 
accepted the notion of a two-state solution, its 
leaders had presumed that would be the even-
tual outcome, while most Arabs in Israel, though 
galvanized by the idea of Palestinian nationalism, 
continued to see their future within the state of 
Israel. Some Israeli Arabs crossed a physical and 
mental line and joined the PLO and its orbit, 
but the vast majority continued to live within the 
Israeli state and system. Israel’s Arab minority did 
not join either the violent conflicts between the 
PLO and Israel or either of the intifadas.
Still, the patterns of organization and activity in 
Israeli-Arab political life underwent profound 
changes after 1967. The Zionist parties’ satellite 
lists disappeared, and nationalist Arab parties 
were formed that found a way of operating within 
the boundaries of Israeli law (most notably Abdel 
Wahab Darawshe’s Arab Democratic Party, 
founded in 1988). Semipolitical civic groups like 
the Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils 
emerged. In the late 1970s a powerful Islamic 
fundamentalist movement appeared, partly as 
a reflection of regional trends and partly in res-
ponse to particular local conditions. Muslim fun-
damentalists in Israel are primarily a religious and 
social phenomenon, but their potential political 
power is enormous.22
In the post-1976 political chronology of the 
Israeli state’s relationship with its Arab citizens, 
three events stand out as particularly significant 
turning points. One was the signing of the Oslo 
Accords between Israel and the PLO in 1993. The 
mutual recognition between Israel and the Pales-
tinian national movement, the establishment of 
the Palestinian Authority, and the prospect of 
Palestinian statehood complicated the self view 
and political perspective of Israel’s Arab minority. 
Most significantly, its members tended to “loca-
lize” their outlook and focus it on their position 
in and relationship with the Israeli state. This ten-
dency was largely a by-product of the PLO lea-
dership’s decision to avoid dealing with the issues 
of the group known in Arab and Palestinian par-
lance as “the Palestinians of 1948.” Because the 
issues of 1948 were to be dealt with in the final-
status negotiations, Israel’s Arabs saw no point in 
antagonizing the Israeli leadership and public by 
raising these sensitive issues earlier.
This being the case, Israel’s Arab citizens felt that 
it was up to them to deal with their position and 
status in Israel. Several developments and forces 
combined to radicalize their quest. What had been 
a minority of 160,000 after the 1948 war had, in 
subsequent years, crossed the 1 million mark. Vil-
lagers became urban dwellers, and an increasingly 
large number of university graduates were frus-
trated by a lack of jobs or unsatisfactory employ-
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ment. Successive Israeli governments failed to 
draw appropriate lessons from the March 1976 
outburst and formulate a comprehensive policy 
for the Arab minority; they settled, at best, on a 
piecemeal approach to this cardinal problem (the 
one exception to this rule was the Rabin govern-
ment of 1992–95). The rise and expansion of the 
Islamic movement introduced into the equation 
a powerful actor that claimed to be apolitical but 
had in fact a considerable, radicalizing political 
impact.
Many, if not most, Arab citizens of Israel were 
primarily preoccupied with mundane issues of 
integration and equality: educational opportuni-
ties, a larger slice of the national economic pie, 
and progress toward economic and civic equality. 
But the political and intellectual elites intensified 
their critique of the very foundations of the state, 
rejecting the prevalent description of Israel as 
of a Jewish and democratic state and advancing 
such themes and ideas as a “bi-national state,” 
the status of a national minority, “reopening the 
files of 1948” and the Nakba (catastrophe) narra-
tive. Nakba is the common Arabic term for the 
events of 1948 and stands in sharp contrast to the 
Israeli-Hebrew narrative of independence and 
liberation.
The second event was the wave of violence that 
burst out in Israel on October 1, 2000, a response 
to the outbreak three days earlier of Palestinian 
violence that came to be known as the al-Aqsa 
intifada. In the clashes between the Israeli police 
and Arab demonstrators and rioters, thirteen 
Arab citizens of Israel were killed. It is difficult 
to overstate the importance of an event that had 
a traumatizing effect on both sides of the Arab-
Jewish divide. On the Jewish side, the violent 
clashes of early October joined the outbreak of 
the intifada in creating the sense of the end of 
an era. If the peace process of the 1990s genera-
ted expectations for the normalization of life in 
Israel, the events of the autumn of 2000 unders-
cored the fact that such normalization remained 
a remote prospect. In certain respects, the Arab-
Jewish clashes inside Israel were more ominous 
than the outbreak of violence with the Palesti-
nian Authority, in that they exposed the perni-
cious potential of the tension between the Israeli 
state and a national minority of nearly 20 percent. 
Critical or even hostile rhetoric by an Arab intel-
lectual or member of the Knesset can be seen as 
releasing tension and frustration in a legitimate 
fashion; but blocking roads or clashes of thou-
sands of angry demonstrators with the police are 
a different matter. From the Arab perspective the 
use of fire arms by the Israeli police was seen as 
unjustified and as yet another manifestation at 
the Israeli state’s hostility.
On the eve of the February 2001 elections, Ehud 
Barak formed a commission of inquiry headed by 
a Supreme Court Justice (the Or Commission) 
to investigate the government’s (particularly the 
police’s) conduct during the October crisis. The 
formation of the Or Commission served to calm 
the atmosphere and to suspend full discussion of 
Arab- Jewish relations in Israel for nearly three 
years—the time taken by the commission to 
complete its work.
The Or Commission published its report in 
September 2003. The bulky report chided poli-
tical leaders (former prime minister Barak, for-
mer interior security minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, 
a number of Arab members of the Knesset, 
or MKs), and the leadership of the police, and 
recommended sanctions against several police 
officers. But the importance of the report (coau-
thored by Professor Shimon Shamir and Justice 
Hashem Khatib) was in the thorough analysis of 
the relationship between the state of Israel and 
its Arab citizens. The commission was critical 
both of the conduct of the leadership of the Arab 
minority and of the Israeli government’s failure 
over the years to deal thoroughly with the poli-
tical and socio-economic problems of the Arab 
minority.
Unfortunately, the Or Commission’s policy 
recommendations were essentially filed away and 
the rift between majority and minority in Israel 
grew ever wider. One outcome of this state of 
affairs was the publication between December 
2006 and May 2007 of four papers authored by 
groups of Arab academics and civic leaders that 
came to be known as the vision documents. The 
documents, collectively and separately, present 
the boldest challenge to date to the current fabric 
of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.
The vision documents constitute a total rejection 
of the current identity and make-up of the Israeli 
state. They are predicated on a refutation of the 
dominant Israeli-Zionist narrative. Israel is pre-
sented as an essentially imperialist, expansionist 
entity. The Arabs in Israel are an integral part of 
the Palestinian Arab people and are the abused, 
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indigenous, or native people. Two broad alterna-
tives are offered to restore their lawful rights: a bi-
national state as a comprehensive solution to the 
Israeli- Palestinian conflict; or a two-state solu-
tion with far- reaching changes in the character 
of the Israeli state, transforming it from a Jewish 
state to “a state for all its citizens.”23
The civic activism and radicalism of the Arab 
nongovernmental organizations in Israel has 
long been matched in the political arena by the 
Arab members of the Knesset. The Arab mino-
rity in Israel now constitutes some 17 percent of 
the population (the Arab residents of East Jeru-
salem not included) and (given the young age 
of the Arab population) 14 percent of the elec-
torate. In Israel’s fragmented-political system, 
when a few votes in the Knesset determine the 
fate of coalitions and governments, 14 percent of 
the electorate could in theory elect fifteen MKs 
and constitute a swing vote in Israeli politics. But 
that would require full acceptance of the rules of 
the game in Israeli politics and a high degree of 
coherence and unity. Neither of these have been 
the case. Over the years, the percentage of Arabs 
voting for what can be called Arab Zionist par-
ties (those willing to participate fully in Israel’s 
political process) declined dramatically, from 52 
percent of the total Arab vote in the 1992 elec-
tions to 18 percent in the 2009 elections. Of the 
15 Arab MKs in 2009, just four were from Arab 
Zionist parties. Turnout among Arab voters has 
also steadily dropped, from nearly 70 percent in 
1992 to 53 percent in 2009.
The trajectory on the Jewish side of the equation 
appears as a mirror image of the dominant trends 
on the Arab side. The bulk of the Jewish popula-
tion has for many years been oblivious and indif-
ferent to this difficult, fundamental problem and 
has been rattled only occasionally, including by 
the violent outbreaks of 1976 and 2000 and by 
occasional egregious statements or acts by Arab 
members of the Knesset. But over time a signifi-
cant part of the Jewish right wing came to assign 
growing importance to what it views as a domes-
tic Arab challenge to Israel’s national identity and 
security.24
In this respect, the signing of the Oslo Accords 
in 1993 was a turning point for the Jewish right 
wing as it was for the members of the Arab mino-
rity. If the fate of the Land of Israel was to be 
decided, should Arab voters be able to tilt the 
decision? The elections of 1996 were to a large 
extent a referendum on the Oslo process, and one 
of Netanyahu’s campaign slogans used his nic-
kname to claim that “Bibi is good for the Jews.” 
Netanyahu won by a small majority; had Peres 
won by an equally small majority, his authority to 
continue the Oslo process would in all likelihood 
have been challenged by right-wing opponents 
claiming, among other things, that he was elected 
by Arab votes and had no moral right to partition 
the “Land of Israel.” (In the 1996 elections, thir-
teen Arab MKs were elected, compared with ten 
in the previous Knesset, and nine of them were 
affiliated with Arab and Jewish-Arab (non-Zio-
nist) parties.)
As the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations wore 
on, and the idea of a land swap became part of 
the agenda, a new idea took hold about exactly 
what land should be swapped. In return for the 
5 percent or so of the West Bank that would be 
annexed to Israel (along with some 80 percent of 
the settlers), the Israeli territory transferred to 
the future Palestinian state should not be a piece 
of southern Israel contiguous to the Gaza Strip, 
but rather a part of Israel with a sizable popu-
lation of Israeli Arabs. The argument (made by 
Israeli centrists as well as those on the right) was 
that such a transfer would consolidate the Jewish 
majority and character of Israel and would ensure 
that a “two-state solution” would indeed rest on 
the country’s partition between a purely Arab and 
a predominantly Jewish state.
Such a swap would in fact be “a transfer in place,” 
whereby a quarter of a million Israeli-Arab citi-
zens would remain in their homes but lose their 
Israeli citizenship and become citizens of a new 
Palestinian-Arab state. The idea’s proponents 
argued that this was hardly a calamity, since the 
population viewed itself as Palestinian. But the 
idea met with fierce opposition, some of it from 
Israeli Jewish liberals, and most of it from Israeli 
Arabs who argued that they wanted to remain 
citizens of a transformed Israeli state rather than 
become the citizens of an ill-defined Palestinian 
one. In short order, though, the centrist advocates 
of this idea were overshadowed by right-wing 
activists. Most prominent among the latter was 
Avigdor Lieberman, head of the Israel Beitenu 
Party, who turned the issue of the Arab minori-
ty’s loyalty (or lack thereof ) into the centerpiece 
of the 2009 election campaign that brought his 
party into Netanyahu’s coalition and landed him 
in the respectable position of foreign minister.
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Lieberman and his party persisted in their cam-
paign against what they call Arab “disloyalty” 
to the Israeli state. This campaign culminated 
in March 2011 in the passage of the third rea-
ding of a Knesset bill that came to be known 
as the Nakba bill. It stipulated that the minister 
of finance was entitled to reduce the budgets of 
state-funded organizations and local municipali-
ties should they reject the existence of the state 
of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Uphol-
ding the Nakba narrative (that the establishment 
of Israel was a catastrophe for Arabs) was cited 
as the prime example of such conduct. The law’s 
authors had a harsher version of their legislation 
in mind as well as other measures but had to 
reach a compromise with other coalition mem-
bers who were reticent on grounds of principle 
or prudence to escalate the tension with the Arab 
minority. But even this milder version marked a 
further escalation in the vicious spiral that has 
come to characterize Israel’s relationship with its 
Arab minority.
Israel And Iraq: Conflict 
without Relations
Iraq occupies a special place among all of Israel’s 
relationships with Arab nations. Iraq is suffi-
ciently remote from Israel to have chosen to act 
as a “nonconfrontation” state, but for a variety of 
reasons its rulers have preferred over the years to 
participate in military conflict with Israel even 
though it does not share a border with Israel. 
Indeed, the absence of a common border has radi-
calized the Iraqi-Israeli relationship. Arab-Israeli 
peace has mostly been predicated on two foun-
dations—that the cost of war is prohibitive, and 
that “land” can be exchanged for “peace.” Neither 
is an element in the Israeli-Iraqi equation, and 
the conflict between the two countries has been 
nourished by other sources.
The pattern was established early. Iraq played 
an important part in the 1948 war, by pushing 
for Arab participation and by sending an expe-
ditionary force to join the Arab campaign. But, 
unlike Israel’s immediate neighbors, Iraq chose 
not to end the war with an armistice agreement, 
and in similar fashion it dispatched expeditionary 
forces in 1967 and 1973 but took no part in the 
diplomatic activities that brought these wars to 
an end.25
Israel’s conflict with the conservative Iraqi regime 
in power during the decade after the 1948 war 
was muted. But the overthrow in 1958 of the 
Iraqi monarchy and its replacement by a suc-
cession of revolutionary and postrevolutionary 
regimes changed the situation. Moved by their 
own ambitions for Arab leadership and their 
competition with Egypt and Syria, Iraq’s leaders 
from Abd al-Karim Qassem to Saddam Hussein 
tended to take the most radical positions concer-
ning Israel and to pursue them from the compa-
rative safety afforded by distance. Israel, in turn, 
was worried by the prospect of having to confront 
Iraq’s full potential as a participant in future wars, 
either as the linchpin of an eastern front compri-
sing Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, or as an immediate 
neighbor if Iraq took over Jordan. To keep such 
possibilities at bay, Israel pursued two principal 
policies: it helped the Kurdish secessionists in 
northern Iraq (hoping to keep Baghdad’s leaders 
preoccupied on that front), and it cultivated a 
strategic alliance with the shah’s Iran. (This latter 
had a broader agenda, but common enmity with 
Iraq was an important component.) These Israeli 
actions, needless to say, were well-known to the 
Iraqis and helped to develop their view of Israel 
as a dangerous national enemy.26
This configuration was altered in the late 1970s 
when Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel, 
when Israel lost its alliance with Iran in the wake 
of the Islamist revolution there, and when the 
Kurdish rebellion collapsed. Saddam Hussein’s 
rise to power in 1979 thus ushered in a period 
of domestic stability in Iraq. Over time, Sad-
dam built an outsized army of sixty divisions and 
also sought to obtain nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction. Along with Hafiz 
al-Asad, Saddam led the opposition to Sadat 
and the Egyptian-Israeli peace, but he and his 
country were soon absorbed in Iraq’s eight-year 
war with Iran.27
Israel was worried not so much about Iraq’s 
conventional military buildup as about its actual 
or potential acquisition and development of wea-
pons of mass destruction—chemical weapons, 
Scud missiles, and, most ominously, nuclear wea-
pons. Israel was not necessarily the only likely 
target: Saddam’s army used chemical weapons 
against Kurdish civilians, and Scud missiles were 
launched against Iran. But the notion that a 
regime like Saddam Hussein’s might be in pos-
session of nuclear weapons was unacceptable to 
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Israel. When, in June 1981, an Israeli air raid des-
troyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Ossirak, Iraq did 
not respond or retaliate, but Israel’s action further 
exacerbated Iraq’s hostility.28
The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 had the 
effect of releasing the huge military machine that 
Saddam Hussein had constructed. He was deter-
mined to use it to aggrandize his regime, and he 
saw Israel as a principal foe and an obstacle to 
his schemes. In April 1990 he publicly warned 
that Iraq possessed “binary chemical weapons” 
and threatened to “make fire eat up half of Israel 
if it tries to do anything against Iraq.” He may 
have been thinking of his plans for the conquest 
of Kuwait, or of Israel’s anticipated opposition to 
any Iraqi act of aggrandizement, but he was also 
trying to deter Israel from interfering with his 
plans and to couch his expansionist schemes in 
anti-Israeli terms.29 In the event, Saddam chose 
to carry out his aggrandizement in the Persian 
Gulf; he occupied Kuwait and threatened Saudi 
Arabia, thus triggering the crisis of 1990 and the 
war of 1991. He positioned himself as a latter-
day Nasser fighting for the Arab cause against the 
West and against Israel, depicting his occupation 
of Kuwait as part of a broader challenge to the 
colonial order that had been imposed on the Arab 
world at the end of World War I. This was hollow 
posturing, and most of the Arab world saw it as 
such. But some mistakenly either accepted Sad-
dam’s claims or believed that he would somehow 
emerge victorious. The PLO’s leaders and many 
Palestinians in the Gulf were among those who 
made these errors.30
During the Persian Gulf War, Saddam fired about 
forty Scud missiles at Israel, primarily in hopes of 
drawing Israel into the war and thus splitting the 
Arab coalition the United States had organized 
against him. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s 
government, partly of its own volition and partly 
under American pressure, did not respond—res-
traint that paid off handsomely. The U.S.-led coa-
lition decimated Iraq’s military machine, and the 
constraints imposed on Iraq by the United States 
through the United Nations at the war’s end led 
to the destruction of almost all, if not all, of Iraq’s 
missiles and unconventional arsenal. In addi-
tion, a sanctions regime severely limited Iraq’s oil 
exports and oil revenues. Washington’s “contain-
ment” of Iraq has thus denied it any effective role 
in the Middle East since 1991.
In the 1980s, at the height of its war with Iran, 
and then in the 1990s, Iraq sent some indirect 
messages to Israel that it was interested in ente-
ring into a tacit dialogue. Some Israeli politi-
cians and strategic planners supported this idea, 
arguing that it could balance the threat posed by 
Iran or provide leverage vis-à-vis Syria. Others 
argued that Saddam was not credible, that Israel 
should support U.S. policy to contain Iraq and 
not subvert it, and that in any event Iraq was not 
seriously interested in dialogue but, at best, in 
buying some goodwill in the United States. The 
latter arguments prevailed, and a tacit dialogue, 
whether or not Saddam intended it, never deve-
loped.
Israel, alongside the United States, closely moni-
tored Iraq’s compliance with the UN regulations 
imposed on Baghdad at the end of the Gulf War. 
With almost all of Iraq’s arsenal of weapons of 
mass destruction and ballistic missiles destroyed, 
as well as its capacity to reproduce them, and with 
Iraq’s oil exports limited to the bare minimum, 
this edge of Iraq’s offensive capabilities was blun-
ted. Saddam’s limited resources were invested 
instead in his regime’s very survival. But he was 
also remarkably consistent in his drive to escape 
this situation, to erode Middle Eastern and 
international support for Washington’s policies, 
and to maintain or restore at least a measure of 
Iraq’s offensive capability. On several occasions, 
the United States responded to these challenges 
with limited military action and in February 1998 
prepared the ground for, but did not carry out, a 
large-scale operation.
As already discussed in chapter 5, George W. 
Bush’s election to the presidency, the terrorist 
attack of September 11, 2001, and ultimately 
Washington’s decision to invade Iraq and topple 
Saddam’s regime transformed this dynamic It 
is still not clear what Iraqi state and what Iraqi 
political system ultimately will emerge from this 
unfinished saga. At this point, Iraq does not play 
an active role in regional politics, and it has yet to 
formulate its own distinct policy vis-à-vis Israel.
Israel has no reason to regret Saddam’s removal, 
but it has been adversely affected by the resulting 
weakening of America’s position in the Middle-
East and by the boost given to Iran’s regional 
ambitions through the removal of its arch rival.
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